University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2014

A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results:
Illuminating Irs Enforcement of § 501(C)(3)'s
Prohibition on Political Intervention
Julia D. Zwak

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zwak, Julia D., "A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results: Illuminating Irs Enforcement of § 501(C)(3)'s Prohibition on
Political Intervention" (2014). Minnesota Law Review. 240.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/240

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

ZWAK_4fmt

11/3/2014 4:46 PM

Note
A Manageable Solution with Meaningful Results:
Illuminating IRS Enforcement of § 501(c)(3)’s
Prohibition on Political Intervention
Julia D. Zwak*
Over 1,200 pastors speak openly to their congregations in
support of political candidates, hoping to prompt investigations
by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and revocation of their
1
organizations’ tax-exempt status. Catholic Answers, a nonprofit religious website, sues the IRS for assessing a tax penalty
based on the organization’s allegedly political statements even
though the IRS had reversed its position and refunded the tax
2
just days before. The NAACP files for a tax refund of $17.65,
baiting the IRS into a federal court battle over its public con3
demnation of a political figure. These real-life examples
* J.D. Candidate 2015, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2011,
Carleton College. Thank you to those who provided feedback on this Note, especially Adjunct Professor Claire Topp, Professor Kristin Hickman, and Morgan Helme. Many thanks to the hardworking staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review. Thank you to the numerous mentors who supported me in my
journey to law school and throughout these three remarkable years. Special
thanks to my friends and family, especially my patient and encouraging husband, Joey Zwak, and my parents, Diane and Rob Reid, who taught me to love
learning and to think critically about the world around me. Above all, I give
thanks to God through whom all things are possible. Copyright © 2014 by
Julia D. Zwak.
1. See Editorial, The Pulpit Should be Free of Politics, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
8, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-irs-church-political
-campaign-johnson-amendm-20130908-story.html (“[P]reachers have endorsed
or opposed candidates by name during religious services, daring the IRS to
sanction them.”); Alliance Defending Freedom, Pulpit Freedom Sunday 2013
Participating Churches, http://www.speakupmovement.org/Church/Content/
pdf/PFS2013FinalParticipantListforPublishing.pdf.
2. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670-IEG (AJB),
2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 Fed. App’x 640 (9th Cir.
2011).
3. COMM’N ON ACCOUNTABILITY & POLICY FOR RELIGIOUS ORGS., GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF POLITICAL SPEECH BY RELIGIOUS AND OTHER
501(C)(3) ORGANIZATIONS 25 (2013), http://religiouspolicycommission.org/

381

ZWAK_4fmt

382

11/3/2014 4:46 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:381

demonstrate the unusual lengths to which § 501(c)(3) taxexempt organizations have gone in attempting to force the IRS
to clarify its application of 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3), the prohibition
on political activity for tax-exempt charities, churches, and ed4
ucational institutions. The rule, applied by the IRS under an
imprecise and malleable facts and circumstances test, prohibits
these organizations from participating or intervening in “any
political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candi5
date for public office.”
Penalties for violating § 501(c)(3)’s political activity prohi6
bition include a warning letter from the IRS, a tax penalty, or
7
even revocation of tax-exempt status. Given the severity of this
last possibility, organizations should have clear guidance to en8
9
sure compliance. In reality, the guidance is far from clear. The
precise contours of the ban on political activity are difficult to
define for three primary reasons. First, § 501(c)(3) was enacted
with minimal legislative history and Congress has not precisely
10
articulated its rationale for imposing the ban. Second, the IRS
uses a facts and circumstances analysis to determine whether
an organization has engaged in political activity, and it pro11
vides little guidance to assist organizations seeking to comply.
Third, few courts have considered the prohibition, and it is unlikely that a court will have an opportunity to impose a more

CommissionReport.aspx [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT] (citing Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People, NAACP Will Challenge the IRS Threat in Fed. Court (Mar. 30, 2006)).
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
5. Id.
6. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 53.
7. See Tax Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations, I.R.S. Publication 1828, at 7 (2013) [hereinafter Tax Guide], available at http://www.irs
.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf.
8. See, e.g., Michael Fresco, Note, Getting to “Exempt!”: Putting the Rubber Stamp on Section 501(c)(3)’s Political Activity Prohibition, 80 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3015, 3053 (2012) (proposing a bright-line rule to determine when revocation of tax-exempt status is appropriate).
9. Cf. Janice Ryan, With Election Around the Corner, Charities Must
Tread Carefully, NONPROFIT TIMES (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www
.thenonprofittimes.com/news-articles/with-election-around-the-corner
-charities-must-tread-carefully (“[T]he line between prohibited and permissible activities is murky and can be easily crossed . . . .”).
10. See Jennifer Rigterink, Comment, I’ll Believe It When I “C” It: Rethinking § 501(c)(3)’s Prohibition on Politicking, 86 TUL. L. REV. 493, 517
(2011) (“[The] politicking ban was introduced as a floor amendment, without
any documented necessity or rationalization.”).
11. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
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specific test because the IRS has consistently avoided litigation
12
concerning the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban.
Despite recurring debates over these issues and periodic
attempts at legislative reform, the prohibition remains a source
of frustration for organizations seeking to advance their mis13
sions. Given the scarcity of case law or administrative rulings
on the application of § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban, scholarly criticisms of the provision have largely been confined to
analysis of hypothetical scenarios or the few existing instances
14
of the rule’s application. More specific details about the nature
and extent of § 501(c)(3) political activity ban violations could
better inform scholarly criticism and improve proposals for legislative reform.
This Note suggests procedural changes that the IRS should
implement to increase transparency and improve regulated organizations’ understanding of its enforcement efforts. Part I
discusses the history of the political activity ban, including recent enforcement efforts by the IRS. Part II examines proposals
for reform posed by scholars, practitioners, and the IRS itself.
Part III proposes enhanced administrative procedures that encourage the IRS to consistently report its investigations of
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban violations. In particular, this
Note suggests that the IRS publish reports detailing its application of the facts and circumstances test to illuminate its enforcement efforts. Such procedures will assist § 501(c)(3) taxexempt organizations seeking to tailor their activities to the tax
code’s current guidelines and will solve many of the problems
posed by the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF § 501(C)(3)’S POLITICAL
ACTIVITY BAN
To further illustrate the problems underlying IRS enforcement of the political activity ban, this Part provides a brief his12. See Erik W. Stanley, LBJ, the IRS, and Churches: The Unconstitutionality of the Johnson Amendment in Light of Recent Supreme Court Precedent, 24 REGENT U. L. REV. 237, 260 (2012) (describing how the IRS has
avoided litigation of its enforcement efforts relating to the political activity
ban).
13. See generally COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 3–4 (“Given the
untenable mix of vagueness in the law, violations without consequences, limited and inconsistent enforcement, and the lack of respect for the law and its
administration that inevitably results, something needs to change.”).
14. See id. at 22–26 (providing examples of “the rare and controversial
cases in which the IRS has initiated enforcement action”).
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tory of the ban since its inception in 1954. Section A describes
the basic textual parameters of the ban and how they developed
over time. Section B identifies existing sources of guidance for
organizations attempting to comply with the provision. Section
C concludes with a description of IRS enforcement efforts in the
past decade and recent public debate around the provision.
A. THE PARAMETERS OF THE PROHIBITION
This Note begins its analysis with the text of this problematic rule. Both the legislative history of § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban and the text of the provision itself are brief. This Section describes each in turn.
1. Congressional Origins
Based on “the benefit the public obtains from their activities,” Congress has granted tax privileges to religious, charitable, scientific, and educational organizations since the early
15
twentieth century. In 1913, Congress determined that nonprofit entities “organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, or educational purposes” would be exempt
16
from federal income taxation. Through the War Revenue Act
of 1917, taxpayers making contributions to such organizations
were granted a deduction in calculating their annual income
17
tax. These benefits have persisted for the past century, although Congress has made some modifications.
In 1934, Congress enacted a new rule limiting the lobbying
activities of organizations exempt from taxation under
18
§ 501(c)(3). If a substantial part of an organization’s activities
consisted of “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation,” it could no longer qualify for tax19
exemption. This provision was enacted in response to a 1930
decision by the Second Circuit, which held the American Birth
Control League was not entitled to exemption because it engaged in propaganda seeking to influence legislation, an action
which went beyond an exclusively religious, educational, or sci20
entific purpose. Congress considered placing additional re15. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
854 (10th Cir. 1972).
16. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II.G(a), 38 Stat. 114, 172 (1913).
17. War Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
18. Income Tax Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 101(6), 48 Stat. 700, 700 (1934).
19. Id.
20. See Slee v. Comm’r, 42 F.2d 184, 185–86 (2d Cir. 1930).
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21

strictions on “participation in partisan politics” but chose to
only limit lobbying activities because the ban would otherwise
22
be “too broad.”
Twenty years later, Congress again had the opportunity to
consider whether § 501(c)(3) organizations should be further
restrained in the political sphere. Lyndon B. Johnson proposed
the political activity ban in the midst of his 1954 reelection
23
campaign for U.S. Senate. Johnson’s campaign was threatened by the involvement of two particularly active § 501(c)(3)
organizations that were outwardly supportive of Johnson’s op24
ponent and critical of Johnson’s politics. In what many schol25
ars have characterized as an attempt to silence his opponents,
Johnson proposed an amendment to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) which
would deny tax-exempt status to “those who intervene in any
political campaign on behalf of any candidate for any public of26
fice.” The amendment’s legislative history is sparse; Johnson
briefly stated his proposal with no explanation of its rationale
27
or motivation. Further, as one commentator has pointed out,
“[t]here was no referral to a committee for further study and
hearings,” and “[t]here was no legislative analysis of the effect
28
of the Amendment on tax-exempt organizations.” Unlike the
lobbying restrictions imposed in 1934, this amendment imposed
29
a complete ban on political activity of any kind. Despite the
significant restriction this presented for § 501(c)(3) organizations and the lack of informed debate on the proposal, the
30
Johnson Amendment became law in 1954.
21. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 73D CONG., REVENUE ACT OF 1934, at
32 (Comm. Print 1934).
22. 78 CONG. REC. 7831 (1934) (statement of Rep. Samuel B. Hill).
23. Stanley, supra note 12, at 244–46.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Why the IRS Should Want To Develop Rules
Regarding Charities and Politics, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 643, 671–72 (2012)
(“Many who have examined the legislative record have concluded that its motive was simply political animus . . . .”); Fresco, supra note 8, at 3020 (“It is
now acknowledged that Johnson likely proposed the amendment in response
to the support that certain exempt organizations gave to his rival . . . .”); cf.
Dallas Dean, A Little Rule That Goes a Long Way: A Simplified Rule Enforcing
the 501(c)(3) Ban on Church Campaign Intervention, 28 J.L. & POL. 307, 315
(2013) (“The motivation for this ban has been criticized as suspect . . . .”).
26. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954).
27. Id.
28. Stanley, supra note 12, at 248.
29. 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954).
30. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 501(c)(3), 68A Stat. 163, 163
(1954).
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2. The Text of the Ban
Congress has since made only one minor change to the political activity ban, adding that § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations are prohibited from not only supporting but also oppos31
ing any candidate for public office. In its present form, the
political activity ban limits § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations to those “which [do] not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate
32
for public office.”
Congress delegated the task of enforcing the Internal Revenue Code to the IRS, which has the authority to promulgate
33
regulations that carry the force of law. The IRS regulations
under § 501(c)(3) provide minor clarifications relating to the political activity ban. First, the regulations prohibit political activity that “directly or indirectly” intervenes in any political
34
campaign. Second, the regulations provide a definition of
35
“candidate for public office.” Finally, the regulations provide
that prohibited activities under the political activity ban “include, but are not limited to, the publication or distribution of
written or printed statements or the making of oral statements
36
on behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate.” Using a
term not found in the statute itself, the regulations label organizations that violate the political activity ban as “action organi37
zations.” These regulations and the statute itself contain the
complete authoritative text of the political activity ban.
B. GUIDANCE FOR ORGANIZATIONS SEEKING TO COMPLY WITH
THE BAN
Along with the text of the statute and regulations, taxexempt organizations have some guidance for understanding
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban from the IRS and the
courts. As this Section will show, however, this guidance is lim31. See Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10,711, 101 Stat.
1330-382, 1330-464 (1987).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012).
33. Id. § 7805(a).
34. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (2012).
35. Id. (“The term candidate for public office means an individual who offers himself, or is proposed by others, as a contestant for an elective public office, whether such office be national, State, or local.” (emphases omitted)).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3).
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ited. First, this Section describes the most useful IRS guidance
for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations in this area. Next, it
discusses the limited case law interpreting the rule.
1. IRS “Guidance”
In addition to Treasury Regulations, the IRS publishes
Revenue Rulings, which examine hypothetical scenarios to clar38
ify how the IRS thinks the law applies to a given set of facts.
In 2007, the IRS published its most comprehensive attempt to
39
clarify the political activity ban through such guidance. Revenue Ruling 2007-41 provides twenty-one hypothetical scenarios
and addresses whether the hypothetical organizations “participated or intervened in a political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office within the mean40
ing of section 501(c)(3).” The scenarios are grouped into categories covering activities such as voter education, individual activity by organization leaders, candidate appearances, and
41
issue advocacy. Some categories include lists of factors that
will be taken into account to determine whether improper polit42
ical activity has taken place.
The examples in Revenue Ruling 2007-41 demonstrate that
the IRS uses a case-specific facts and circumstances analysis to
determine whether an organization has violated § 501(c)(3)’s
43
political activity ban. This method of analysis builds on prior
Revenue Rulings addressing specific areas of activity such as
44
45
voter education and candidate forums. The determination in
these examples often depends on such factors as the timing of
38. Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (“The purpose of publishing revenue rulings and
revenue procedures in the Internal Revenue Bulletin is to . . . assist taxpayers
in attaining maximum voluntary compliance.”).
39. Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
40. Id. at 1421.
41. Id. at 1422–24.
42. Id. at 1424.
43. See id. at 1422 (“[A]ll the facts and circumstances are considered in
determining whether an organization’s activities result in political campaign
intervention.”).
44. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 (describing voter education
activities that will not be deemed political activity under § 501(c)(3)); Rev. Rul.
80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178 (illustrating circumstances under which a newsletter
identifying the voting records of Congressional incumbents will be deemed appropriate activity under the political activity ban).
45. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73 (describing how a § 501(c)(3)
tax-exempt organization can present a candidate forum without violating the
political activity prohibition).
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the activity, whether the activity is part of the organization’s
usual activities outside of election season, and whether the activity relates to an issue that has divided political candidates
46
for a specific office.
For a number of reasons, Revenue Ruling 2007-41 falls
short in providing practical guidance for § 501(c)(3) organizations. First, many of the hypothetical scenarios fail to identify a
rationale for the conclusion regarding whether political activity
47
has occurred. Second, the facts and circumstances test is not
articulated in any specific form; no comprehensive list of factors
is presented, and the factors identified under certain categories
48
are not weighed in terms of importance. Third, the twenty-one
examples are presented as isolated occurrences involving only
49
one type of activity. The Revenue Ruling specifically addresses this fact, stating that “[i]n the case of an organization that
combines one or more types of activity, the interaction among
50
the activities may affect the determination.” The IRS has clarified that the conclusions in a Revenue Ruling are “directly responsive to and limited in scope by the pivotal facts” present51
ed. Therefore, unless an organization finds itself in the precise
factual situation as one of the hypothetical organizations, it
cannot rely on Revenue Ruling 2007-41 as an authoritative
guide. While Revenue Ruling 2007-41 sheds some light on what
the IRS considers to be a violation of the political activity ban,
it also leaves much open to interpretation.
Another potential source of IRS guidance is a private letter
ruling. Tax-exempt organizations may request a private letter
ruling to seek an explanation of how the IRS might treat cer52
tain activities under § 501(c)(3). A letter ruling is “a written
statement issued to a taxpayer by [the IRS] that interprets and
applies the tax laws or any nontax laws applicable to . . . ex53
empt organizations to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.” For
two reasons, however, this option may be infeasible and un46. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1423–24.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1422.
51. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(a) (2012).
52. See Exempt Organizations - Private Letter Rulings and Determination
Letters, IRS (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/
Charitable-Organizations/Exempt-Organizations-Private-Letter-Rulings-and
-Determination-Letters.
53. Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 129.
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workable for tax-exempt organizations attempting to comply
with § 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on political activity.
First, the expense of a private letter ruling request is not
insignificant. The IRS requires organizations to submit a fee of
$10,000 before it will consider a request for a private letter rul54
ing. In addition, an organization cannot request a private letter ruling through a simple phone call or letter to the IRS. The
IRS requires organizations to follow a complex process involving many detailed steps in order to obtain a private letter rul55
ing. Many of these steps involve legal analysis for which an
organization would likely wish to seek the advice of an attor56
ney. Combined with the $10,000 fee, the expense of legal advice would likely be insurmountable for many tax-exempt organizations, particularly small charities and non-profit
57
organizations.
Second, a private letter ruling may not be an ideal source
of guidance for organizations attempting to respond to timesensitive policy issues approaching the line of candidate-related
political activity. Private letter rulings are processed as the IRS
receives them, and requests for expedited processing are
58
“granted only in rare and unusual cases.” The IRS thus “urges
all taxpayers to submit their requests well in advance of the
59
contemplated transaction.” A tax-exempt organization may
54. Rev. Proc. 2014-8, 2014-1 I.R.B. 242, 247; see also Rev. Proc. 2014-4,
2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 139.
55. See Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 163–65 (listing the required
steps for obtaining a private letter ruling in a three-page checklist containing
thirty-three separate items); id. at 130 (explaining that the IRS will not issue
private letter rulings in response to oral requests).
56. See id. at 139–45. Each private letter ruling request must contain the
following components: a statement of facts, all documents related to the transaction, a statement of supporting and contrary legal authorities, an analysis of
the issue, a statement describing whether the issue has been ruled on or dealt
with in a previous return, a statement regarding pending legislation that may
affect the ruling, a statement identifying any requested deletions to be made
for the public record of the letter ruling, the signature of the taxpayer or a representative, and a statement affirming the veracity of all statements under
penalty of perjury. See id.
57. Cf. IRS Affirms That It Only Provides Assurance on Changes in Activities by Private Letter Ruling, NONPROFIT WATCHMAN (Spring 2013), http://
www.nonprofitcpa.com/irs-affirms-that-it-only-provides-assurance-on-changes
-in-activities-by-private-letter-ruling (“[T]he total cost of obtaining a PLR may
be significant. For larger organizations or organizations for which the risk of
noncompliance could be great, the cost may be justified in order to obtain the
assurance of affirmation by the IRS.”).
58. Rev. Proc. 2014-4, 2014-1 I.R.B. 125, 146.
59. Id. at 147.
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not be able to do so, however, if it wants to make a timely response or statement regarding important pending policy matters. Further, organizations cannot proactively request a letter
ruling about potential situations they might encounter in the
future since the IRS refuses to issue letter rulings on “alternative plans of proposed transactions or on hypothetical situa60
tions.” And even if an organization presents a factual scenario
with a live question to the IRS, the agency may decline to issue
a letter ruling altogether if it determines that issuing a letter
ruling would not be “appropriate in the interest of sound tax
61
administration.” Given the significant expense and unpredictable timing involved in requesting a private letter ruling, this
source of guidance cannot adequately address the problems
posed by § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban.
2. Judicial Review: An Unlikely Source of Clarification
Another potential source of authority for interpreting
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban is judicial opinions. As noted
by a number of scholars, however, “[o]nly a very small number
of court decisions have involved the campaign intervention
62
prohibition.” The mechanics of the prohibition demonstrate
why this may be so. When an organization violates the political
activity ban, the IRS may respond by sending a warning let63
64
ter, imposing an excise tax for any expenditures incurred, or
65
revoking the organization’s tax-exempt status. A warning letter in itself would not likely provide the taxpayer with standing
to sue the IRS as there is no injury in fact based on receiving a
66
letter. An organization faced with the latter two penalties may
60. Id. at 138.
61. Id. at 132; see also id. at 149 (explaining that the IRS may decline to
issue a private letter ruling).
62. Aprill, supra note 25, at 655.
63. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 53.
64. See 26 U.S.C. § 4955 (2012).
65. See id. § 501(c)(3).
66. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (providing
that a plaintiff “must have suffered an ‘injury in fact,’” meaning “an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” in order to bring a lawsuit (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not likely
that the receipt of a warning letter, without more, would be deemed a concrete
invasion of a legally protected interest. But see Edward Sherman, “No Injury”
Plaintiffs and Standing, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 834, 835–36 (2014) (summarizing various types of cases in which plaintiffs have struggled to establish
standing and illustrating ways the “no injury” barrier might be overcome).
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have a basis to challenge the IRS determination in court, but
the IRS can easily avoid such litigation as described below.
67
In the case of an excise tax, an organization that seeks to
challenge the imposition of the tax in federal court must first
pay the tax and request a refund by filing an administrative
68
claim. After these steps are taken, the organization may then
69
challenge the tax by filing a lawsuit. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dealt with
70
this scenario in Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States. Catholic Answers, Inc., a nonprofit religious organization, posted
letters on its website critiquing Senator John Kerry’s views on
71
a variety of political issues such as abortion. The IRS initiated
a lengthy investigation and determined that Catholic Answers
had engaged in political activity warranting the imposition of
72
an excise tax in May 2008. Catholic Answers paid the tax but
73
sought a refund from the IRS in September 2008. In March
2009, the IRS notified Catholic Answers that it was abating the
tax because it had determined that “the political interven74
tion . . . was not wilful and flagrant and was corrected.” Catholic Answers initiated a federal lawsuit less than one week later challenging the IRS’s determination that it had engaged in
75
political activity. The District Court did not reach the merits
of this claim, however, finding that the IRS’s tax abatement
rendered the refund suit moot and that the case presented no
76
“issues capable of repetition yet evading review.” This case
demonstrates how the IRS can avoid judicial review of its determination that political activity has taken place by simply re67. See 26 U.S.C. § 4955 (2012) (providing that the IRS may impose a tax
on political expenditures of § 501(c)(3) organizations). See generally BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “excise” as “[a] tax imposed on
. . . an . . . activity”).
68. 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (2012).
69. Id.
70. Catholic Answers, Inc. v. United States, No. 09-CV-670-IEG (AJB),
2009 WL 3320498 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2009), aff’d, 438 Fed. App’x 640 (9th Cir.
2011).
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
76. Id. at *8. But see Church of Scientology v. United States, 485 F.2d 313,
316 (9th Cir. 1973) (2-1 decision) (illustrating how an issue apparently mooted
by a tax refund may be deemed “capable of repetition yet evading review” in
limited circumstances (internal quotation mark omitted) (citing S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911))).
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versing its position or deciding that the intervention was not
77
serious enough to warrant a tax penalty.
In a few prominent cases, courts have reviewed the IRS’s
decision to revoke an organization’s tax-exempt status based on
the political activity ban. These cases illustrate that the courts
give substantial deference to the IRS’s determinations in this
area. In 2000, the IRS revoked the tax-exempt status of Branch
Ministries, a § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt church, based on its in78
volvement in political activity. Leading up to the 1992 presidential election, Branch Ministries placed a full-page advertisement in two national newspapers urging Christians not to
79
vote for Bill Clinton. A statement at the bottom of the ad stated: “Tax-deductible donations for this advertisement gladly ac80
cepted.” After an investigation of the church’s activities, the
81
IRS revoked its tax-exempt status. Branch Ministries challenged the revocation as an exercise of selective prosecution in
82
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the revocation, deferring to the IRS’s
83
judgment in this area.
The court’s treatment of Branch Ministries’ selective prosecution claim illustrates the significant deference granted to the
IRS in applying the facts and circumstances test. To support its
claim, Branch Ministries submitted “several hundred pages” of
newspaper articles reporting on church political activity that
84
had failed to come under IRS scrutiny. The IRS admitted that
77. See Elizabeth J. Kingsley, Challenges to “Facts and Circumstances”—
A Standard Whose Time Has Passed?, TAX’N EXEMPTS, Mar./Apr. 2010, at 43,
47–48 (describing obstacles to judicial review for § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations, drawing on the Catholic Answers case as one example).
78. See Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 140.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 141–42. Branch Ministries also challenged the revocation as a
violation of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. A discussion of the
First Amendment implications of the ban is beyond the scope of this Note. For
thorough discussions of the First Amendment issues around the political activity ban, see generally NINA J. CRIMM & LAURENCE H. WINER, POLITICS, TAXES, AND THE PULPIT: PROVOCATIVE FIRST AMENDMENT CONFLICTS (2011);
Keith S. Blair, Praying for a Tax Break: Churches, Political Speech, and the
Loss of Section 501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 405 (2009);
H. Chandler Combest, Symbolism as Savior: A Look at the Impact of the IRS
Ban on Political Activity by Tax-Exempt Religious Organizations, 61 ALA. L.
REV. 1121 (2010).
83. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 145.
84. Id. at 144.
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some of these examples could have resulted in a finding that
85
the organization violated the political activity ban, but the
court rejected Branch Ministries’ selective prosecution claim
because it “failed to demonstrate that it was similarly situated
86
to any of those other churches.” As the court emphasized,
“[n]one of the reported activities involved the placement of advertisements in newspapers with nationwide circulations opposing a candidate and soliciting tax deductible contributions
87
to defray their cost.” Admittedly this activity by Branch Ministries presents a particularly egregious example of prohibited
political activity under § 501(c)(3). Nevertheless, the court’s decision highlights how difficult it would be for an organization to
obtain meaningful judicial review of the IRS’s facts and circumstances analysis. Because the IRS has such latitude and flexibility in considering the unique facts of a given case, a court
will be unlikely to impose a more exacting analysis or implement a more specific test.
Another reason that courts would be unlikely to challenge
the IRS’s revocation of tax-exempt status is that the IRS likely
reserves this penalty for the most clear—and obviously politi88
cal—violations. Although IRS guidance on the prohibition is
not altogether clear, Branch Ministries’ advertisement could
not be understood as anything other than an attempt to inter89
vene in an election. Other cases similarly illustrate the clearly
political circumstances warranting revocation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the IRS’s revocation of a religious
organization’s § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status when it “attacked
President Kennedy . . . and urged its followers to elect con90
servatives like Senator Strom Thurmond.” The organization
went on to name more specific candidates in its publications
91
and broadcasts. In another case, the Second Circuit upheld
the IRS’s decision to deny tax-exempt status to an organization
when it published ratings of judicial candidates identifying
whether they were “approved,” “not approved,” or “approved as

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 655 (describing how Branch Ministries involved “undisputed express intervention”).
89. See id.
90. Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
856 (10th Cir. 1972).
91. Id.
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92

highly qualified.” In each of these examples, the organizations
engaged in activity that can clearly be identified as an attempt
to intervene in or influence an election. Judicial review of the
IRS’s decisions in these cases, therefore, does little more than
reiterate the obvious.
C. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
In response to the problems posed by the political activity
ban, the IRS has taken action in the past decade to enhance its
enforcement efforts against § 501(c)(3) organizations. This Section first describes the IRS’s efforts and then identifies existing
debates around the remaining problems with the prohibition. It
concludes with a description of recent developments in a related area—IRS regulation of politically active § 501(c)(4) social
welfare organizations.
1. The Political Activities Compliance Initiative
Acknowledging that “[t]he issue of political campaign intervention by § 501(c)(3) organizations presents unique chal93
lenges,” the IRS developed a program known as the Political
Activities Compliance Initiative (PACI) to “promote compliance
with the IRC § 501(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign
94
intervention.” The IRS repeated this initiative during three
95
successive elections in 2004, 2006, and 2008. PACI involved a
“fast track” process through which IRS agents would screen re96
ferrals of § 501(c)(3) violations on an expedited basis. The
team identified the cases as complex, non-complex, or not war97
ranting examination. PACI also involved a separate methodology for examining churches as required under the Church
98
Audit Procedures Act. Through PACI, the IRS hoped to establish its “enforcement presence” and “reinforce [its] education ef99
forts.”

92. N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n v. Comm’r, 858 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1988).
93. IRS, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE FINAL REPORT 1
(2006), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/final_paci_report.pdf [hereinafter 2004
PACI REPORT].
94. Id.
95. Aprill, supra note 25, at 659–62 (describing the PACI program).
96. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
97. Id. at 6.
98. See id. at 2; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2012) (outlining the methodology the IRS follows for a church tax inquiry).
99. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1.
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The IRS prepared reports summarizing its findings in both
100
the 2004 and 2006 PACI initiatives, but failed to do so for the
101
2008 election cycle. During the three PACI cycles, the IRS in102
vestigated more than 250 organizations. Seven organizations
had their tax-exempt status revoked based on violations of the
103
political activity ban. As the IRS explained in its 2004 PACI
104
Report, it is unable to discuss the specific details of these investigations based on 26 U.S.C. § 6103, which ensures the con105
fidentiality of tax returns and information contained therein.
Detailed information is only available when organizations publicly acknowledge that they have been selected for IRS scruti106
ny.
Despite its inability to publicize the specific facts and circumstances involved in the 250 PACI investigations, the IRS
used PACI data to develop the twenty-one hypothetical scenar107
ios identified in Revenue Ruling 2007-41. In its 2010 Annual
Report, the IRS Exempt Organizations Division suggests that
future PACI initiatives will be incorporated into more formal
processes as the IRS “move[s] review of allegations of political

100. Id.; IRS, 2006 POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE (2007),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/2006paci_report_5-30-07.pdf [hereinafter 2006
PACI REPORT].
101. See EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, IRS, TAX EXEMPT AND GOVERNMENT
ENTITIES
(2010),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fy2011_eo_workplan.pdf
[hereinafter 2010 ANNUAL REPORT]; cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 662 (“The
2010 Annual Report from the director of exempt organizations provides the
only information on the 2008 PACI.”).
102. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 20.
103. Id.
104. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
105. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012); see also Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1355–56 (2007) (“Under section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS is prohibited from releasing taxpayer information
in all but very limited circumstances . . . [and] is therefore prohibited from disclosing whether a particular 501(c)(3) organization is being investigated or, if
it is, the resolution of any case.”).
106. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 82, at 429–32 (describing the IRS’s investigation of All Saints Church, which consciously chose to make the investigation
public).
107. See Political Activity Compliance Initiative (2006 Election), IRS (June
25, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Charities-&-Non-Profits/Charitable
-Organizations/Political-Activity-Compliance-Initiative-(2006-Election)
(“Building on the experience gained through its compliance projects, the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 2007-41.”).
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campaign intervention from project to process.” It is not clear
at this time whether these processes have been put in place.
2. Current Dialogue: The Debate Is Not Over
Although the PACI program has faded out of the public’s
attention, debates surrounding the political activity of
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations persist. The Pulpit Free109
dom Sunday initiative is an extreme example of the public
call for reform. Started in 2008 by Alliance Defending Freedom,
a national conservative nonprofit organization that seeks to defend religious liberty, Pulpit Freedom Sunday encourages pastors and other religious leaders to speak openly about political
110
candidates to their congregants once per year. The goal of
this movement is “to generate test cases [to] carry to the U.S.
Supreme Court” in order to challenge the constitutionality of
111
the political activity ban. In response to such church political
activity, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a federal
112
lawsuit urging the IRS to actively enforce its own regulations.
Although the IRS has largely ignored Pulpit Freedom Sunday
113
for many years, it recently affirmed that it “does not have a
policy at this time of non-enforcement specific to churches and
114
religious institutions.” Some commentators have nonetheless
called for more aggressive enforcement against such politically
active tax-exempt organizations. For example, a September
2013 L.A. Times editorial argues that “[f]ar from needing to be
108. 2010 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 101, at 20.
109. Alliance Defending Freedom, supra note 1.
110. See Alliance Defending Freedom, Speak Up: Pulpit Freedom Sunday
Frequently Asked Questions 1–2, http://www.adfmedia.org/files/ChurchFAQ_
PulpitFreedom.pdf (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
111. Id. at 1.
112. See Kate Tracy, IRS to Atheists: Okay, We’ll Investigate Pulpit Freedom Sunday Pastors, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (July 25, 2014, 11:33 AM),
http://www.christianitytoday.com/gleanings/2014/july/irs-to-atheists-okay
-well-investigate-pulpit-freedom-sunday.html.
113. See Joan Frawley Desmond, U.S. Supreme Court Denies Appeal in
First Amendment Case, NAT’L CATHOLIC REG. (Nov. 21, 2012), http://www
.ncregister.com/daily-news/u.s.-supreme-court-denies-appeal-in-first
-amendment-case (“Many sources indicate the IRS has not taken action
against electioneering churches for three years.”).
114. Decision and Order, Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Koskinen,
No. 12-C-0818, 2014 WL 3811050, at *1–2 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 1, 2014), available
at http://ffrf.org/uploads/legal/IRS-Politicking-Decision.pdf (granting a joint
motion for dismissal in a case filed by the Freedom From Religion Foundation
against the IRS for its persistent failure to investigate church political activity).
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repealed, the ban on politics in the pulpit ought to be enforced
115
more aggressively.” Although the most vociferous appeals
seem to surround the activity of churches in particular, secular
charities and nonprofit institutions have also weighed in. For
example, two commentators criticized the IRS’s “amorphous”
facts and circumstances test in a recent article in The Chronicle
116
of Philanthropy. One author suggested that under current
rules, IRS staff have “no clearer a criterion than ‘knowing polit117
ical activity when they view it.’” With opinions along all
points of the spectrum, it appears that both the public and the
tax-exempt organizations subject to the rule are ready to see
significant changes in IRS enforcement of § 501(c)(3)’s political
activity ban.
Despite the continued debate in the public sphere, Congress has not acted to alter the political activity ban. In the
years preceding PACI up until the present, many legislators
have proposed bills seeking to repeal or amend the rule, but
118
none of these proposals has led to a change. A recent example
introduced by Representative Walter B. Jones seeks to repeal
the political activity ban in its entirety “[t]o restore the Free
Speech and First Amendment rights of churches and exempt
119
organizations.” This bill was referred to the House Ways and
120
Means Committee in January 2013, but appears to have
stalled without further comment. In early 2011, Senator
Charles Grassley commissioned a report addressing potential
121
changes to the political activity ban. This comprehensive report, drafted by the newly formed Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations, was completed in
122
August 2013. Another group of tax law experts and practitioners known as the Bright Lines Project also recently submit123
ted proposed rule changes to Congress. It remains unclear,
however, what will be done with these new proposals.
115. Editorial, supra note 1.
116. Ellen P. Aprill & Lisa Gilbert, Fixing the IRS: Clarify the Rules on Political Involvement, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (June 3, 2013), http://
philanthropy.com/article/article-content/139583.
117. Id.
118. See generally Rigterink, supra note 10, at 500–01 (summarizing Congressional proposals to amend § 501(c)(3) since 2001).
119. H.R. 127, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).
120. Id.
121. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
122. See id.
123. See Gregory L. Colvin, Bright Lines Project Submits Legislation to
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3. New Proposed Rules for § 501(c)(4) Social Welfare
Organizations
A recent development at the IRS has raised new opportunities for continued debate around the political activity ban. In
May 2013, the IRS admitted to applying greater scrutiny in reviewing conservative organizations’ applications for tax-exempt
124
status over a period of three years. This news prompted a
public outcry, a criminal investigation, and overhaul of the IRS
125
administration. Responding to these events, the IRS issued a
set of Proposed Treasury Regulations seeking to alter the rules
governing the political activity of § 501(c)(4) social welfare or126
ganizations.
Organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(4) are
those “operated exclusively for the promotion of social wel127
fare.” An organization qualifies as a social welfare organization if “it is primarily engaged in promoting in some way the
common good and general welfare of the people of the commu128
nity.” Under existing regulations, “[t]he promotion of social
welfare does not include “direct or indirect participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to
129
any candidate for public office.” The IRS applies this rule using a facts and circumstances analysis, similar to the
130
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban. Unlike § 501(c)(3) organizations, however, social welfare organizations may engage in
131
some amount of political activity. Due to the unclear definition of political intervention and the difficulty of quantifying a
Congress To Fix Tax Law on Political Activity, NONPROFIT L. MATTERS (July
16, 2013), http://bit.ly/19LvLng.
124. See generally Sean Sullivan, Everything You Need To Know About the
IRS Scandal, FIX-WASH. POST (May 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/05/21/what-we-know-and-what-we-dont-about-the
-irs-scandal (providing a summary of the targeting scandal and explaining
what was known about it within the first few weeks after the IRS announced
its activities).
125. See id.
126. I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013); see also Stephen
Dinan, IRS Moves To Clean Up Scandal of Tea Party Targeting, WASH. TIMES
(Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/26/irs-moves
-clean-tea-party-targeting-scandal-proble.
127. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4)(A) (2012).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2012).
129. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii).
130. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,536 (Nov.
29, 2013) (comparing the application of the facts and circumstances test for
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) organizations).
131. Id.
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§ 501(c)(4) organization’s social welfare activity compared to its
political intervention, these rules have also been a source of
132
significant confusion.
In late November 2013, the IRS proposed new regulations
to clarify its enforcement in this area. In its proposed regulations, the IRS uses a new term—“candidate-related political activity”—to describe what will be deemed political interven133
tion. This term is defined by a list of specific activities such as
134
expressly advocating for a candidate or making contributions.
The IRS acknowledges that this set of rules may be over- or
under-inclusive when compared with a facts and circumstances
analysis, but argues that “adopting rules with sharper distinctions . . . would provide greater certainty and reduce the need
135
for detailed factual analysis.” This approach marks a major
shift from the amorphous facts and circumstances approach
that the IRS has used for decades and indicates a potential for
widespread reform of IRS enforcement against politically active
tax-exempt organizations.
However, the IRS has made it clear that its new regulations would not apply to § 501(c)(3) organizations. In the IRS’s
view, “because [political] intervention is absolutely prohibited
under section 501(c)(3), a more nuanced consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances may be appropriate in that
136
context.” The IRS hinted that it may consider changing this
view by inviting the public to comment specifically on whether
the proposed rules or a similar set of regulations would be ap137
propriate in the § 501(c)(3) context.
The public welcomed this invitation with zeal. The IRS received a record-setting number of public comments on the pro138
posed regulations —greater than 150,000 based on recent es139
Along all points of the political spectrum, the
timates.
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(iii), 78 Fed. Reg. 71,535, 71,541.
134. See id.
135. Id. § 1.501(c)(4)-1, 78 Fed. Reg. at 71,536–37.
136. Id. at 71,537.
137. See id.
138. Rick Cohen, 143,764 Comments Submitted to IRS on Proposed
501(c)(4) Regulations, NONPROFIT Q. (Mar. 11, 2014, 2:48 PM), http://
nonprofitquarterly.org/policysocial-context/23825-143-764-comments
-submitted-to-irs-on-proposed-501-c-4-regulations.html.
139. Julie Patel, IRS Chief Promises Stricter Rules for “Dark Money” Nonprofit Groups, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (June 18, 2014), http://www
.publicintegrity.org/2014/06/18/14960/irs-chief-promises-stricter-rules-dark
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comments offered robust criticisms of the proposed regulations,
noting their overbreadth, potential to inhibit civic engagement,
140
and likely collateral effects on § 501(c)(3) organizations. The
IRS’s proposed regulations have been widely recognized as a
failed attempt, with one commentator suggesting that they are
141
“dead in the water” and another deeming them “an abomina142
tion.” The IRS intends to publish a new set of proposed rules
in early 2015 and will seek additional public input before mov143
ing forward with any final regulations. The November 2013
proposed regulations applied to § 501(c)(4) tax-exempt organizations alone, and the IRS does not plan to include § 501(c)(3)
144
organizations in its next round of rulemaking. Nevertheless,
the proposed regulations have renewed vigorous debate over
the appropriate boundaries of § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban.
The IRS has scaled back its aggressive enforcement efforts
around § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban and appears content
with its existing guidance in Revenue Ruling 2007-41. It has
seen room for reform in its enforcement against § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, but explicitly expressed a desire to
maintain the facts and circumstances analysis under
§ 501(c)(3). Meanwhile, Congress has not significantly changed
the ban for over fifty years. In the midst of this stagnation,
§ 501(c)(3) organizations and the public are calling for change.
Part II of this Note considers some of these proposals for reform.
II. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY SCHOLARS,
PRACTITIONERS, AND THE IRS
The problems inherent in the § 501(c)(3) political activity
ban have persisted for several decades. Acknowledging the
complexity of the issues involved, one scholar has noted that
meaningful reform would require a “conversation between
-money-nonprofit-groups.
140. See Cohen, supra note 138.
141. Matea Gold, IRS Plan To Curb Politically Active Groups Is Threatened
by Opposition from Both Sides, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/irs-plan-to-curb-politically-active-groups
-threatened-by-opposition-from-both-sides/2014/02/12/99dcfd2a-932a-11e3b46a-5a3d0d2130da_story.html.
142. Id.
143. Chris Vest, IRS Sheds Light on Next Attempt at Nonprofit Political
Activity Rules, ASSOCIATIONS NOW (June 23, 2014), http://associationsnow
.com/2014/06/irs-sheds-light-next-attempt-nonprofit-political-activity-rules.
144. See id.
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lawmakers, religious and charitable leaders, and people of faith
to reshape the foundation of American policy dealing with the
145
interaction between tax exemption and politics.” This conversation has indeed taken place, and various groups have come
forward with proposed solutions. This section will discuss some
of these proposals for reform. Section A identifies a variety of
scholarly proposals to reform § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban.
Section B highlights two recent comprehensive proposals developed by groups of scholars and practitioners. Section C assesses
the IRS’s PACI program with a view toward future alternatives.
A. SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Reflecting the variety of perspectives in the conversation,
scholars have posed a wide range of solutions to the political
activity ban. This Section first analyzes proposals that focus on
religious organizations. Next, this Section considers proposals
to alter the tax consequences for engaging in political speech.
This Section concludes by identifying proposals that call for
new rules to clarify the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban.
1. Religious-Specific Proposals
Many scholars have considered the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban as it relates to churches in particular, proposing
rules that would have their sole or primary impact on religious
organizations. One proposal suggests that Congress create a
new tax classification for houses of worship to free them from
146
restrictions on their internal partisan political speech. Under
this proposal, churches could opt into the new tax classification
to receive the benefits of tax-exemption as long as they agree
not to engage in political speech or agree to limit their political
147
Along similar
speech to purely internal communications.
lines, scholars have suggested safe harbors allowing religious
leaders to freely engage in political speech “directed internally
to [their] congregants or others who willingly seek out such

145. Jerome Park Prather, Tax Exemption of American Churches and Other Nonprofits: One Election Cycle After Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 94 KY.
L.J. 139, 159 (2005).
146. See CRIMM & WINER, supra note 82, at 323, 337–52.
147. Id. This suggestion is part of a larger proposal which would also replace the political activity ban with a rule that eliminates the tax benefits for
donors to § 501(c)(3) organizations that engage in political speech, whether
secular or religious. See id. at 326–37.
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148

communication” or to speak “directly to their members on
matters that walk the line between purely ‘religious’ and purely
149
‘political’” speech. Others would “allow religious organizations to engage in political speech so long as it is related to
150
their religious purpose.” On the other end of the spectrum,
some would argue that the IRS should more strictly enforce the
law as it relates to churches and revoke their tax-exempt sta151
tuses if they engage in any political speech. Finally, some
suggest that the ban should not apply to churches at all because it is an unconstitutional infringement on First Amend152
ment speech and free exercise rights.
As these proposals indicate, the IRS faces unique challenges in enforcing the political activity ban against religious organizations. Many religious organizations engage in charitable activities that closely mirror the activities of secular organiz153
ations, suggesting that similar enforcement makes sense. On
the other hand, important differences exist based on the First
Amendment concerns of limiting religious speech or subsidizing
religion through special tax treatment. Any solution must take
these considerations into account, but proposals that only address church political activity will not improve the situation for
the rest of the § 501(c)(3) organizations struggling to comply
with the rule. Without discounting the viability of these proposals, this Note encourages a solution with broader applicability to all § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations.
2. Altering Financial (Dis)incentives for Engaging in Political
Speech
Commentators have also introduced proposals that seek to
address the problems inherent in the political activity ban
through tax incentives. Some suggest restricting tax deductions
148. Dean, supra note 25, at 328 (emphasis omitted).
149. Blair, supra note 82, at 437.
150. 4 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR. & ROBERT T. SMITH,
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW § 17:20 (2013).
151. See, e.g., Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed:
Have American Churches Failed To Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious
Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW 29, 79 (2004).
152. E.g., Stanley, supra note 12, at 282.
153. See Kara Backus, Note, All Saints Church and the Argument for a
Goal-Driven Application of Internal Revenue Service Rules for Tax-Exempt Organizations, 17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 301, 306 (2008) (“[C]hurches are able to
provide a vast array of services to the community. They are involved in, among
many other things, the prevention of teen pregnancy, fighting crime and substance abuse, community development, education, and child care.”).
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for donors contributing to politically-engaged charities or
154
Under this proposal, the political activity ban
churches.
would be lifted, but organizations choosing to engage in politi155
cal activity could not receive tax-deductible contributions.
Another creative suggestion proposes allowing § 501(c)(3) organizations to elect to pay a “self-directed tax” in order to avoid
156
being subject to penalties under the political activity ban. Organizations electing this option would pay a tax for engaging in
political speech and could dictate which areas of spending the
157
government should support with its tax dollars.
These proposals ignore a central problem with the political
activity ban—the lack of clarity around what constitutes political intervention. In order for these tax consequences to apply,
organizations and the IRS must still identify when their activities cross the line into political activity. A lasting solution to
the political activity ban must address this issue by giving
§ 501(c)(3) organizations clearer guidance about how the rule is
applied.
3. Rule Clarification Proposals
A third category of proposed solutions seeks to clarify the
application of the political activity ban to improve IRS regulation and enforcement. One scholar suggests that the IRS must
produce “a more robust set of rules” to replace the current
158
vague standards that govern compliance. Rules, she suggests,
are better suited than standards based on “the low level of enforcement, the large number of affected parties, and the num159
ber of affected parties unlikely to seek legal advice.” Multiple
scholars have similarly proposed that Congress or the IRS
160
adopt bright-line rules for enforcing the political activity ban.
154. CRIMM & WINER, supra note 82, at 322–23.
155. Id.
156. W. Edward Afield, Getting Faith out of the Gutters: Resolving the Debate over Political Campaign Participation by Religious Organizations
Through Fiscal Subsidiarity, 12 NEV. L.J. 83, 101 (2011).
157. See id.
158. Aprill, supra note 25, at 680.
159. Id. at 682.
160. See, e.g., Kay Guinane, Wanted: A Bright-Line Test Defining Prohibited Intervention in Elections by 501(c)(3) Organizations, 6 FIRST AMEND. L.
REV. 142, 155 (2007) (“There are strong public policy reasons for developing
bright-line rules defining impermissible campaign intervention.”); see also
Fresco, supra note 8, at 3053 (proposing the bright-line rule that “[s]peech will
constitute revocable political intervention when it refers to a clearly identified
candidate and reflects a view on that candidate”).
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Developing such rules would certainly improve clarity for organizations seeking to comply with the ban. As the following
Section will illustrate, however, such rules may not completely
clarify the situation and depend largely on the willingness of
Congress or the IRS to undertake comprehensive reform.
B. TWO RECENT PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS
Two different groups of commentators have recently developed proposals to reform IRS enforcement of the political activity ban. These proposals are worth highlighting in detail because they collectively represent the input of a broad range of
individuals—tax professionals, academics, and leaders of nonprofit and religious organizations. Both proposals offer solutions that seek to resolve the myriad concerns underlying the
debate through legislative or regulatory change.
1. The Bright Lines Project
In 2009, a group of tax experts, practitioners, and nonprofit
leaders convened to discuss changes to § 501(c)(3)’s political ac161
tivity ban. Since that time, nine of these individuals contin162
ued to meet to develop a proposal for change. This group, the
Bright Lines Project (BLP), submitted its proposed rule chang163
es to Congress in July 2013. The group’s proposal advocates
six bright-line rules that will give § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations greater guidance in complying with the political activi164
ty ban.
First, the BLP proposes a clarification of the term “candidate” and extends the rule’s application to foreign election
165
campaigns. Next, it suggests that the definition of “political
intervention” be modified consistently throughout the tax code,
166
not only in § 501(c)(3). Third, the proposal adopts the brightline rule that it is political intervention to “expressly advocate”
for the election, defeat, nomination, or recall of a clearlyidentified candidate or candidates affiliated with a specific par161. See Bright Lines Project, The Bright Lines Project: Clarifying the IRS
Rules for Political Intervention 1 (May 2013) (draft report), http://www
.citizen.org/documents/Bright-Lines-Proposal-(May%202013).pdf [hereinafter
BLP Draft Report].
162. See id.
163. See Colvin, supra note 123.
164. See BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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ty. This proposed rule also considers it to be political intervention when an organization expressly advocates that voters
select candidates based on one or more criteria that clearly distinguish certain candidates from others or expressly advocates
168
political expenditures. Fourth, if an organization is not engaged in express advocacy under rule three, its speech will be
deemed political intervention if “(a) it refers to a clearlyidentified candidate and (b) it reflects a view on that candi169
date.” Along with this rule, the BLP proposes four safe harbor
exceptions to such speech if the organization is attempting to
influence an official’s actions in his or her current term of office, comparing candidates in a voter education effort, responding in self-defense to a candidate’s statement about the organization, or when the statements are personal, oral remarks at
170
official meetings. Fifth, the BLP proposes that it should be
deemed political intervention to provide resources to support or
171
oppose any candidate’s election. Finally, the BLP suggests
that communications which are political speech under rule
four, do not fall under a safe-harbor provision, and “are targeted to voters in states, districts, or other locations, where close
election contests are occurring, are conclusively political inter172
vention.” In other situations, organizations may provide evidence of other facts and circumstances to defend their actions
173
as non-political.
In short, these rules “seek to establish a new definition of
political intervention that uses bright lines and safe harbors. If
the organization’s speech is not clearly covered by that definition, it can fall back on the current ‘facts and circumstances’
174
approach in its defense.”
2. The Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious
Organizations
Undertaking a similar effort as the BLP, the Commission
on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations (The
Commission) prepared a report for Senator Charles Grassley
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 4.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 1.
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with recommendations to Congress and the IRS. This report
176
was released in August 2013, shortly after the BLP presented
its recommendations. The Commission, comprised of fourteen
members and sixty-six panel members from legal, nonprofit,
177
and religious communities, sought to “strike a necessary balance” between permitting organizations to engage in speech
relevant to their organizations while expending funds con178
sistent with their tax-exempt purposes. The Commission’s
report makes five related recommendations to achieve this
goal.
First, the report recommends that the political activity ban
179
should not be repealed. Next, it proposes an exception to the
180
ban for “no-cost political communications.” Under this exception, “certain communications that are made in the ordinary
course of a 501(c)(3) organization’s regular and customary exempt-purpose activities and that do not involve an expenditure
of funds do not constitute participation or intervention in a po181
litical campaign.” Third, for activities outside of the no-cost
political communications exception, the Commission suggests
that only the following actions should be deemed prohibited political intervention: (a) a communication that involves an expenditure of funds, clearly identifies a political candidate, party, or organization and contains express words of advocacy to
elect, defeat, or make a political contribution, or (b) a contribution of money, goods, services, or facilities to a political candi182
date, party, or organization. Fourth, the Commission proposes that the appropriate sanction for political intervention
should be an excise tax under § 4955 rather than revocation of
tax-exempt status unless the intervention is “willful and substantial or frequent in relation to an organization’s activities as
183
a whole.” Finally, the Commission recommends the repeal of
175. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3.
176. See Press Release, Comm’n on Accountability & Policy for Religious
Orgs., New Solutions Proposed to Congress on Political Speech of Clergy and
Religious Leaders by National Commission of Religious and Nonprofit Leaders
(Aug. 14, 2013), http://religiouspolicycommission.org/Content/Commission
-Press-Release-8-14-2013.
177. See id.
178. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.
179. See id. at 27.
180. Id. at 28.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 31–32.
183. Id. at 33.
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26 U.S.C. § 7409, which gives the IRS authority to obtain an injunction prohibiting a § 501(c)(3) organization from making po184
litical expenditures.
3. Brighter Lines but an Imperfect Solution
A comparison of these proposed sets of rules illustrates
that they have some points of agreement but approach the solution differently. Both agree to an extent that expending an exempt organization’s resources to support a candidate should be
185
deemed political intervention. Both also draw on the notion of
“express advocacy” to narrow the definition of political inter186
vention. The Commission’s most significant change would be
the creation of the no-cost political communication exception to
187
the political activity ban. This proposal significantly broadens
the activities that an organization can undertake without fear
of crossing the line into prohibited political activity. The BLP’s
proposed rules would also expand the scope of protected activities but would do so through a more complex set of rules and
safe harbors. Both groups use the phrase “brighter lines” in de188
scribing their proposed rules, qualifying any claim that the
new rules are completely clear. Indeed, each proposal leaves
open some gray areas in which organizations may be left confused. For example, under the BLP proposal, rule six refers to
“close election[s]” as a factor for determining when an organiza189
tion is engaged in political intervention. Whether something
is a “close election” may depend on the particular race, the
number of candidates, and the importance of the outcome for a
184. See id. at 34.
185. Compare BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 4 (proposing that it is
political intervention “to provide any of the organizations resources . . . if the
transferee uses such resources to support or oppose any candidate’s election to
public office,” with a few exceptions), with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3,
at 31–32 (proposing that it should be deemed political intervention to
“contribut[e] money, goods, services, or use of facilities to one or more political
candidates, political parties, or political organizations”).
186. Compare BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 2 (suggesting that “[i]t
is political intervention to expressly advocate” for a specific candidate or party), with COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 31–32 (proposing that it
should be deemed political intervention to expend funds and communicate
“express words of advocacy” on behalf of a candidate).
187. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 28.
188. Id. at 32; see Bright Lines Project, The Bright Lines Project: Clarifying
IRS Rules on Political Intervention: Drafting Committee Explanation 6 (July
2013) (interim draft), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Bright%20Lines%
20Project%20Explanation.pdf.
189. BLP Draft Report, supra note 161, at 4.
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190

particular community. In addition, rule six allows organizations to raise defenses to IRS enforcement based on the unique
191
This
facts and circumstances surrounding their activity.
again leaves room for discretion in considering what factors
may warrant a deviation from the other bright-line rules. The
Commission’s definition of “no-cost political communications”
also raises issues for clear enforcement because it requires the
IRS and organizations to identify which activities are “in the
ordinary course of a 501(c)(3) organization’s regular and cus192
tomary exempt-purpose activities.” These ambiguities do not
render these proposed sets of rules ineffective in clarifying the
contours of the political activity ban. They are simply worth
noting to illustrate that even the most comprehensive and carefully-drafted rules leave room for interpretation. A new set of
rules may answer many questions but would still leave room
for IRS discretion in enforcing the prohibition.
Although they indeed provide brighter lines for implementing the ban, both proposals also depend on a Congressional revision to § 501(c)(3) or the development of new IRS regulations.
Without either institution taking the necessary steps to implement comprehensive reform, the political activity ban will remain unchanged and organizations will continue to be left
without meaningful guidance. This Note does not challenge
that these proposals might legitimately resolve the ambiguities
in the political activity ban but suggests that the IRS adopt a
smaller change with a more immediate impact. The next Section illustrates what such a change might involve by revisiting
the IRS’s enforcement activities in PACI.
C. REVISITING PACI
The IRS’s efforts to increase compliance with § 501(c)(3)’s
political activity ban through the PACI initiatives in 2004,
2006, and 2008 might be characterized as an attempted solution to the problems inherent in the provision. This Section will
review that attempt and explain how the IRS missed its opportunity to clarify its enforcement of the rule. It will first illustrate how PACI failed to resolve the ambiguities in its application of the facts and circumstances test. It will then conclude by
discussing the taxpayer privacy protections that limited the
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 28 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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IRS’s ability to comprehensively report its activities in a meaningful way.
1. PACI’s Limited Success
The IRS’s first PACI Report illustrates that it was aware of
the problems generated by the rule. The IRS identified several
challenges it faced in implementing the rule, including First
193
Amendment concerns, limited sanctions and the harsh effects
194
of revocation, and the ambiguity of the facts and circum195
stances approach. Despite acknowledging these many problems, the IRS did not make any particularly meaningful steps
toward a solution through PACI.
The PACI reports do little to clarify how the facts and circumstances test may be applied in any given scenario. At best,
they give § 501(c)(3) organizations an idea of which general
categories of activity may be more likely deemed political than
others. For example, the 2004 PACI Report identifies the following data patterns: out of twenty-four cases relating to the
distribution of printed documents, nine cases were deemed political intervention; out of seven cases relating to political contributions made to a candidate, five were deemed political intervention; out of eleven cases relating to candidates speaking
at exempt organization functions, nine were deemed political
intervention; and out of fourteen cases involving distribution of
196
voter guides, four were deemed political intervention. Similar
197
data is presented for nine categories of intervention. This data does little more than suggest that when the IRS enforces
§ 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban, the answer is almost always
“it depends.”
The IRS’s PACI efforts did appear to have an influence on
preventing repeat offenses by particular organizations. As the
2006 PACI Report states, “[t]he 2006 review of the organizations identified in the 2004 PACI found no instances of repeat

193. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (“The activities that give
rise to questions of political campaign intervention also raise legitimate concerns regarding freedom of speech and religious expression[.]”).
194. See id. at 2 (“The existing sanctions are limited to assessing penalties
based on the amount spent on the intervention, which is often de minimis, or
revocation, which may not be in the public interest.”).
195. See id. at 1 (“The Code contains no bright line test for evaluating political intervention.”).
196. See id. at 16–17.
197. See id.
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198

political intervention.” For those particular organizations investigated in 2004, therefore, perhaps the PACI efforts helped
them to better understand what activities they should avoid in
the future. On the other hand, it may be that these organizations were simply more cautious in subsequent years and
avoided activities that might be deemed political intervention.
Regardless of what this outcome suggests, it applies only to
those organizations investigated in 2004. For the remaining
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations throughout the country
seeking to comply with the ban, PACI was not much help.
2. Privacy as a Barrier to Understanding
Another problem that the IRS acknowledged in its PACI efforts was its limited ability to discuss its enforcement actions
199
based on the disclosure restrictions under 26 U.S.C. § 6103.
The relevant restriction prohibits the IRS from disclosing
200
“[r]eturns and return information.” The statute defines “return information” with a lengthy list including a taxpayer’s
identity, exemptions, liability, and any written determination
201
not otherwise subject to public inspection. This subsection
concludes with the exception that return information “does not
include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or oth202
erwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.”
Court precedent provides some clarification regarding the
types of information protected under § 6103 and that which
may be properly disclosed. In Church of Scientology of California v. IRS, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of the exception to the general rule against disclosure, suggesting that
“Congress did not intend the statute to allow the disclosure of
otherwise confidential return information merely by the redac203
tion of identifying details.” Rather, the exception was intended to allow the IRS to disclose “statistical studies and other
compilations of data” similar to those that the IRS had routine204
ly prepared prior to the adoption of § 6103. Subsequent cases
have similarly drawn a distinction between taxpayer-specific
198. 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note 100, at 5.
199. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (“The disclosure restrictions of IRC section 6103 limit IRS’s ability to discuss its enforcement actions.”); see also 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (2012).
200. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a).
201. Id. § 6103(b)(2).
202. Id.
203. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
204. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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information and aggregate taxpayer information compiled for
205
analysis. Such data compilations need not only include raw
numbers, charts, and graphs; such data may also include substantive information about relevant investigative facts and the
206
IRS’s own legal analysis. The key distinction between taxpayer-specific information and analytical data compilations explains why the IRS was able to report trends in its PACI enforcement activities but felt constrained by § 6103 from
providing further detail.
Commentators have highlighted § 6103 as a major limita207
tion in effective enforcement of the political activity ban. To
remedy this issue, scholars have suggested solutions ranging
from creating an independent Commission to investigate politi208
cal activity ban violations and report on its decisions to simpler solutions such as making redacted versions of revocation
209
notices available to the public. As one scholar suggests, “the
IRS must take steps to consider how to create a public record of
investigative results and investigative reasoning while main210
taining the integrity of the privacy statute.” This Note will
build on these proposals to suggest practical ways that the IRS

205. Compare Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 614–16 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(allowing disclosure of legal analysis contained within IRS memoranda because such analysis was not taxpayer specific), with Landmark Legal Found.
v. IRS, 267 F.3d 1132, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (prohibiting disclosure of a third
party’s requests for information about audits of tax-exempt organizations due
to the requests’ “taxpayer-specific character”).
206. See, e.g., Tax Analysts, 117 F.3d at 614 (cataloguing various interpretations of the word “data” in Supreme Court cases).
207. See, e.g., OMB WATCH, THE IRS POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ENFORCEMENT
PROGRAM FOR CHARITIES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS: QUESTIONS AND
CONCERNS 10 (2006) (“Because Section 6103 of the tax code prohibits the IRS
from disclosing information about its investigations, the exact facts and circumstances the agency believes constitute partisan electioneering remain a
mystery.” (emphasis omitted)); Blair, supra note 82, at 427 (“Because of the
confidentiality requirement, churches do not have clear guidance regarding
the circumstances under which an investigation will be started or what activities are permissible or impermissible.”); Tobin, supra note 105, at 1355–56
(summarizing the effect of § 6103’s privacy provision on the enforcement of the
political activity ban).
208. See Tobin, supra note 105, at 1359–60.
209. See OMB WATCH, supra note 207, at 13 (“[R]edacted versions of advisory letters or notices of revocation of exempt status would give charities and
religious organizations a clearer idea of what activities they should avoid.”);
Guinane, supra note 160, at 167 (“Redacted copies of IRS determinations and
warning letters would at least give 501(c)(3)s some idea of how the IRS applies
the ‘facts-and-circumstances’ test to specific situations.”).
210. Backus, supra note 153, at 335.
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can communicate its enforcement efforts to increase transparency and understanding.
Although the IRS knew the problems underlying its enforcement of the political activity ban, it failed to directly respond with a permanent solution. However, this missed opportunity should not be understood to suggest that the IRS has
completely lost its chance at contributing to reform. The IRS
was able to develop the PACI program without adopting new
regulations or waiting for Congressional change. With minor
improvements to its processes, the IRS can implement a new
solution that more appropriately responds to the problems with
the political activity ban.
For decades scholars have proposed solutions to improve
IRS enforcement of the political activity ban, approaching the
issue from a variety of perspectives. Momentum has increased
in the past year as the BLP and the Commission submitted
formal rule change proposals to Congress and the IRS. The IRS
itself has sought to address the problem through the PACI program and experienced limited success. Building on these developments, Part III of this Note proposes procedural changes that
the IRS should adopt to increase transparency and understanding among § 501(c)(3) organizations.
III. GREATER TRANSPARENCY IS NEEDED IN IRS
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
This Part proposes that the IRS adopt new procedures to
routinely publicize useful information about its enforcement efforts against § 501(c)(3) organizations engaging in potentially
prohibited activity. Section A describes the mechanics of the
proposed procedures. Section B identifies the benefits of the
proposal, considering short-term and long-term results.
A. PROPOSED PROCEDURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY AND
UNDERSTANDING
Organizations exempt from taxation under § 501(c)(3) must
have appropriate guidance for complying with the political activity ban. A comprehensive rule change may address this problem, but there is a more manageable solution that would provide consistent and useful information for these organizations.
In order to clarify its enforcement efforts around the § 501(c)(3)
political activity ban, the IRS should adopt the following procedures:
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1. Reporting on section 501(c)(3) investigations.
Twice annually, the Internal Revenue Service will release a report identifying every completed investigation of a
tax-exempt organization under the political activity ban. The
report will identify—
(a) the events leading to the investigation,
(b) the facts and circumstances that the Internal Revenue Service considered in its determination regarding whether
political intervention occurred,
(c) whether the Internal Revenue Service determined
that political intervention occurred and why,
(d) what, if any, penalties were imposed, and
(e) whether the organization was religious or secular.
2. Inviting disclosure of protected information.
(a) For every completed investigation initiated under section 501(c)(3)’s prohibition on political activity, the Internal
Revenue Service will invite organizations to waive their disclosure protections under § 6103 as they relate to the investigation.
(b) To avoid improper disclosure of protected information
for organizations that choose not to waive these protections, the
Internal Revenue Service must present its results in a form
which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly
or indirectly, a particular taxpayer.
The IRS’s 2004 and 2006 PACI Reports revealed similar information such as the number of investigations it pursued, results of its investigations, sanctions imposed, types of activities
investigated, and trends among secular and religious organiza211
tions. This Note builds on the PACI Reports to suggest that
the IRS increase its transparency by providing more useful information for § 501(c)(3) organizations such as the actual facts
and circumstances the IRS considers in its investigations. Although the IRS may not disclose return information under 26
U.S.C. § 6103, it can lawfully report on its enforcement activities within the parameters of § 6103’s limitations by crafting its
212
reports to avoid improper disclosure. Such reports would pro211. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93; 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note
100.
212. For example, the IRS could report its § 501(c)(3) enforcement activities
in a similar form as the manner in which it publishes Technical Advice Memo-
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vide useful and much-needed information to affected organizations about the IRS’s enforcement of the political activity ban.
B. SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED
REGIME
A primary benefit of the proposed solution is that it will
have immediate results for organizations seeking to plan their
activities while avoiding improper involvement in political affairs. In addition, the proposal will have lasting benefits if the
IRS or Congress moves forward in amending the rule. This Section describes these immediate and long-term benefits.
1. Immediate Benefits
First, the proposed procedures will clarify how the IRS applies the facts and circumstances test to enforce the political activity ban. By reporting the details of each investigation it conducts, the IRS will give organizations a much clearer sense of
how it applies the rule. As mentioned, the IRS has made attempts to provide similar information to organizations through
213
guidance such as Revenue Ruling 2007-41. It has also published various guides that reiterate the facts and circumstances
214
test along with example scenarios. The examples in these
sources provide only limited guidance because they are not necessarily based on actual investigations. They also oversimplify
the real-life circumstances that organizations encounter by an215
alyzing individual activities in isolation. Reported instances
of real activities would better advise organizations seeking to
understand what is permissible.
randa, guidance issued by the Office of Chief Counsel that “provide[s] the interpretation of proper application of tax laws, tax treaties, regulations, revenue rulings or other precedents” to a specific taxpayer’s situation. Technical
Advice Memorandum, IRS (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Technical-Advice-Memorandum. When publishing such information, the IRS
removes information that could identify a particular taxpayer and replaces it
with a generic identifier. Id.; see, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 201,350,033
(Dec. 18, 2013) (illustrating the method by which the IRS replaces identifying
information with identifiers such as “Taxpayer” or “Company A”). The specific
information that the IRS must remove before publishing Technical Advice
Memoranda is governed by statute. See 26 U.S.C. § 6110(c) (2012). See generally Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (discussing
Technical Advice Memoranda in considering how § 6103 should apply to legal
analyses contained in IRS documents).
213. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421.
214. See, e.g., Tax Guide, supra note 7, at 7–15.
215. See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421, 1422 (“Note that each of these situations involves only one type of activity.”).
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Some may argue that this proposal fails to clarify the ambiguity in the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban by allowing the
IRS to maintain its case-by-case facts and circumstances approach. Many scholars and practitioners, including those involved in the Commission on Accountability and Policy for Religious Organizations and the Bright Lines Project, advocate
replacing the current approach with a set of more clearly de216
fined rules. Current IRS enforcement of the political activity
ban under the facts and circumstances test is admittedly vague
and unpredictable, but it can be clarified without adopting a
new set of rules. The IRS enforces many of its provisions based
on fact-specific inquiries, and taxpayers must often comply with
217
rules interpreted under a facts and circumstances analysis.
In these situations, taxpayers turn to case law or revenue rulings to predict how the law will apply to their specific circumstances. Given the shortage of case law on the application of
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban, these procedures will fill
the gap by providing a comprehensive body of real-life examples that organizations can consider in planning their activi218
ties.
Second, the proposed solution can be implemented without
a formal rule change by the IRS or Congress. Like the 2004,
2006, and 2008 PACI programs, the IRS can implement these
procedures and publicly report the results of its investigations
219
on its own. Separate from the more formal guidance con220
tained in Treasury Regulations or Revenue Rulings, the IRS
routinely reports the results of its enforcement activities to the
216. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Richard J. Kovach, Bright Lines, Facts and Circumstances Tests, and Complexity in Federal Taxation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1287,
1312–17 (1996) (describing the “[w]idespread use of facts and circumstances
determinations” in tax law and noting the challenges for practitioners and
taxpayers who regularly encounter such tests).
218. Cf. Tobin, supra note 105, at 1358 (“Because practitioners generally
use case law to advise taxpayers with regard to tests that rely on facts and circumstances, the dearth of cases makes it very difficult for a practitioner to determine what is, and what is not, permissible political activity.”).
219. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 7801 (2012) (delegating enforcement of the
Internal Revenue Code to the Secretary of the Treasury); The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/The
-Agency,-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (“The IRS is organized to carry
out the responsibilities of the secretary of the Treasury under section 7801 of
the Internal Revenue Code.”).
220. For a concise summary of the most common sources of formal IRS
guidance, see Understanding IRS Guidance - A Brief Primer, IRS (Feb. 2,
2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Understanding-IRS-Guidance-A-Brief-Primer.

ZWAK_4fmt

416

11/3/2014 4:46 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:381

221

public. This Note recommends that the IRS regularly engage
in such reporting in the area of § 501(c)(3) political activity.
These informal reports may not be authoritative precedent
which would bind the IRS in its subsequent enforcement activities, but they could greatly increase organizations’ understanding of how the IRS enforces § 501(c)(3)’s political activity ban.
Developing a new set of comprehensive Treasury Regula222
tions would not be an easy task, and the success of any Congressional change would depend on how the IRS actually im223
plemented it. The proposed procedural changes provide a
manageable alternative that could be adopted prior to the next
election cycle. Because the political activity ban raises sensitive
issues ranging from free speech and religious freedom to the
transparency of campaign financing and intervention, any new
proposal will invite more debate and criticism. In the hopes of
limiting such criticism, this Note offers a moderate step with
practical results.
Although they could be easily adopted, the proposed procedures may raise privacy concerns by making information about
§ 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations publicly available. A few
considerations indicate why this may not be such a serious issue. As mentioned, the IRS regularly reports on its enforce224
ment activities in other areas and did so following the 2004
225
and 2006 PACI programs. In addition, multiple organizations
singled out for enforcement under the political activity ban
have willingly revealed information relating to IRS enforce226
ment activities in the past. Following these examples, some
221. See, e.g., Compliance & Enforcement News, IRS (Aug. 28, 2014), http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Compliance-&-Enforcement-News.
222. The IRS’s recent effort to adopt new political intervention rules for
§ 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations illustrates the arduous task of developing regulations. As the IRS emphasized in its press release announcing the
proposed regulations, “[t]here are a number of steps in the regulatory process
that must be taken before any final guidance can be issued.” I.R.S. News Release IR-2013-92 (Nov. 26, 2013); cf. Aprill, supra note 25, at 683 (“The IRS
should undertake the difficult work of writing a set of rules for the campaign
intervention prohibition.”).
223. See, e.g., Fresco, supra note 8, at 3055 (“The effectiveness of any proposal will depend largely on how the IRS enforces the prohibition.”).
224. See Compliance & Enforcement News, supra note 221.
225. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93; 2006 PACI REPORT, supra note
100.
226. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 25–26 (describing how
the NAACP publicly announced that it was being investigated by the IRS and
released a letter it had received from the IRS to the public); see also Blair, supra note 82, at 430–32 (explaining how an IRS investigation of church political
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organizations will likely be willing to reveal information about
the investigations in order to increase transparency around the
IRS’s enforcement actions. Further, for activities that are already public in nature (publishing literature, maintaining a
website, making public comments), organizations would be revealing little about their own activities by allowing the IRS to
227
report publicly on its investigation. Despite these considerations, some organizations may legitimately wish to keep their
actions private and maintain the taxpayer privacy protections
under 26 U.S.C. § 6103. The proposed solution gives organizations this option while encouraging disclosure as a valid alternative.
A final short-term benefit of this Note’s proposal is its impact on the continued debate over IRS enforcement in this area.
The proposed reports would inform public debate around the
ban by providing concrete information about the number and
type of investigations being pursued by the IRS. The current
secrecy around IRS enforcement in this area raises questions
about selective enforcement and may lead to misunderstandings about the actual number of violations by § 501(c)(3) taxexempt organizations. The IRS acknowledged this problem in
its 2004 PACI Report, suggesting that “media reports on the
activities of a small representation of [over one million 501(c)(3)
organizations] can, rightly or wrongly, create an impression of
228
widespread noncompliance.” Because PACI involved a concerted effort to increase investigations and enforcement, however, its results did not necessarily clear up any of these misconceptions. This Note’s proposal would provide a more
accurate picture of the extent of prohibited activity taking
place. This in turn would inform the public debate and allow a
more reasoned analysis of the current situation.
2. Long-Term Benefits
As one scholar has suggested, “[s]hort term improvements
can help provide better guidance while the long-term task of
229
developing bright-line rules is underway.” Although a comactivity became public when the church issued a press release).
227. See 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2 (“The questionable activities are public.”). But see id. (“The activities . . . can be difficult to document,
because they often involve events and statements that may not be recorded or
otherwise captured.”).
228. 2004 PACI REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
229. Guinane, supra note 160, at 167.
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prehensive rule change would be much harder to implement,
scholars and the public are indeed pressing for such a change.
If Congress or the IRS chooses to promulgate new rules in this
area, the proposed reporting procedures will lay important
groundwork for embarking on this task. The § 501(c)(3) political activity ban was adopted with no study or debate about the
rationale behind the rule or its practical effects on § 501(c)(3)
organizations. This may explain why the current rule has proven so difficult for the IRS to enforce. As one commentator suggests, the laws relating to the political activity ban could be rewritten “to better reflect the current state of political
230
involvement by section 501(c)(3) organizations.” Adopting the
proposed procedural changes would shed light on the current
situation and ensure that any new rules reflect reality.
The proposed procedures could also provide a better picture
of how secular and religious organizations vary in their political involvement. As mentioned, much of the debate around the
political activity ban singles out churches and religious organizations for unique consideration. The current rule is applied in
the same manner regardless of whether the organization is
secular or religious. Without a clear body of examples on how
the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban is enforced and applied
against secular and religious organizations, Congress may have
difficulty discerning whether a separate rule is appropriate.
This Note’s proposed reports would allow Congress and the IRS
to see whether a separate rule for religious organizations is
needed and would illuminate what differences, if any, exist in
the political engagement of secular and religious § 501(c)(3) organizations.
Although this Note’s proposal may prove useful in facilitating a more formal rule change, it should not be seen as a solution that will become unnecessary after the adoption of new
guidelines for § 501(c)(3) organizations. Twice-annual reporting
on the IRS’s enforcement in this area would be useful regardless of whether the current standard is maintained or new
rules are adopted. Section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations—
particularly small charities, churches, and schools—are less
likely to seek out formal legal advice in planning their activities
231
than other organizations with more resources to spare.

230. Prather, supra note 145, at 159.
231. See Aprill, supra note 25, at 667 (explaining that a large number of
§ 501(c)(3) organizations are very small and thus “unlikely to devote scarce
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Transparent enforcement will continue to be useful for these
organizations even if a more concrete set of rules is adopted.
Further, continued reporting will allow the IRS and the public
to assess whether any new rules are being implemented in a
fair and consistent manner.
The IRS should adopt this proposal by reporting consistently on its enforcement of the § 501(c)(3) political activity ban.
Such increased transparency will clarify how the IRS applies
the facts and circumstances test in enforcing the prohibition,
and it can be implemented without a complex rule change. Further, this proposal will inform public and scholarly debate and
will have long-term benefits if Congress or the IRS decides to
amend the prohibition.
CONCLUSION
The political activity ban codified in 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
has caused confusion and frustration for § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt
organizations for decades. The prohibition’s sparse legislative
history and ambiguous text, limited Revenue Rulings, and minimal case law offer little guidance for compliance. Although the
IRS has attempted to enforce the provision rigorously through
its PACI efforts, § 501(c)(3) organizations and the public remain confused.
In response to this lack of clarity, scholars have proposed a
variety of reforms, including two comprehensive sets of proposed rules recently submitted to Congress. Although these
measures may provide some clarification, they depend on Congress or the IRS to be fully implemented. This Note proposes a
more immediate and manageable solution to increase transparency and understanding. To clarify its application of the
§ 501(c)(3) political activity ban, the IRS should consistently
report on its investigation and enforcement activities in this
area. This solution offers an immediate response to the problem, allowing § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organizations to focus on
their charitable, religious, and educational goals.

resources to engage professionals to help them interpret the current standards”).

